ELECTRONIC RIGGING 2022
47%
I encoded the numbers from https://halalanresults.abs-cbn.com/ which is based on Comelec’s transparency server. [see image]
The trend of Leni’s votes vs BBM from 37% electoral returns up to 77% ER is at a consistent, linear 47%.
From a data analyst’s perspective, this is highly improbable considering that we are looking at millions of data points.
Either the numbers are pre-computed, or 47% is a really lucky number for the favored politician.
Please, for the sake of transparency, have this investigated.
When I woke up to this post on May 10, 2002, I thought the election had been electronically rigged. I had anticipated this outcome three years ago.
“The Canary in a Coal Mine—Dry Run for Massive Electronic Cheating in 2022 Elections”—see:
https://oddsandendsgonzalinhodacosta.blogspot.com/2019/12/placeholder_28.html
Human behavior always shows variance, especially behavior based on attitude, which voting is. Only human response with a strong automatic or determined character shows low variance.
It is a suspicious pattern that requires investigation.
P.S. See Rappler reference in Comments section below.
Presently, the entire electoral system for ensuring transparency and accountability in recording and reporting voting results, including the Smartmatic system, is not completely free from prospective tampering and fraud.
Smartmatic provides us with an account of the electoral system audits in the Philippines, as follows:
begin
To promote transparency and build trust, Smartmatic and Comelec conducted a series of audits which involved the key elements of the automated election system:
Source code review. Comelec accredited eight groups, including major political parties and poll watchdogs, to examine the source code of the platform and ensure that all three components of the system -- vote counting machines (VCM), election management software (EMS) and the consolidation and canvassing system (CCS) -- followed the requirements of the law and work properly.
The source code review process began on October 1, 2015, and ran until the third week of April. In addition to this process, the US-based company SLI Global also certified that the source code is election-ready.
Hardware Acceptance Testing. All hardware was physically tested in the presence of Comelec to show and validate that everything worked as intended and met the required specifications.
Pre-election Logical Accuracy Test (PRE-LAT). The pre-election logical accuracy test was conducted to verify the configuration of each machine to be deployed. The test simulated an entire electoral cycle.
Final Testing and Sealing (FTS). The FTS was performed on each VCM one week before the E-Day. This test, which involved inserting ten ballots into the machine as a final check before the actual elections and the sealing of the machine so that no further handling is permitted, is performed by the Board of Election Inspectors and witnessed by political parties.
Random Manual Audit (RMA). The Random Manual Audit is a test that validates the accuracy of the count. Immediately after the elections, 1% of the machines all over the country are randomly selected to compare the electronic count vis a vis the manual count.
end
https://www.smartmatic.com/case-studies/article/the-philippines-2016-general-election-audits/
—“The Philippines 2016 General Election: Audits,” Smartmatic
At least one security step, Final Testing and Sealing (FTS), is vulnerable to sabotage afterward because the VCMs are directly handled and stored by COMELEC and its contractors.
Can we trust COMELEC? NO.
Our suspicion of COMELEC is based on the past conduct not only of COMELEC but also that of the Duterte administration.
Duterte is responsible for the appointment of the COMELEC commissioners presently sitting. The fact that COMELEC is packed by Duterte makes it naturally deserving of our deep mistrust.
We cannot be fully confident that COMELEC will ensure a transparent, accountable, fair, truthful, and accurate vote testifying to the genuine choice of the Philippine people.
Our mistrust is well-founded. See, for example, the following articles about COMELEC:
Comelec awards electoral distribution contract to Duterte Crony Dennis Uy.
See:
—CNN Philippines Staff, “Done deal: Comelec signs P535-M contract with Dennis Uy’s logistics firm,” CNN Philippines, November 1, 2021
Uy’s contract is for the distribution of ballots, vote-counting machines, and other election paraphernalia for the 2022 elections.
The deal involves a major conflict of interest because Dennis Uy is a notorious crony of Duterte, who has a direct interest in the election of the Marcos-Sara ticket.
In violation of the Omnibus Election Code, Comelec does not allow election stakeholders to directly observe the ballot printing by the National Printing Office (NPO).
begin
The Comelec has been criticized for not giving election stakeholders access to the NPO, where 67.4 million ballots were being printed for the 2022 elections.
The poll body said strict pandemic restrictions were the reason why it had to postpone observation by various groups of the printing process earlier this year, when Metro Manila and other parts of the country grappled with a COVID-19 surge.
But stakeholders were unconvinced by the explanation, saying Comelec could have at least conducted a livestream of the printing to ensure transparency.
end
See:
—Dwight de Leon with a report from Sabrina Joyce Go, “Comelec to allow random ballot sampling amid printing transparency issue,” Rappler.com, March 15, 2022
Comelec is biased in the two cases involving the cancellation of Marcos Jr.’s Certificate of Candidacy and his disqualification, respectively.
“While muscularly argued, the decision of the commissioners of the Comelec 2nd Division fails to give due regard to the robust merits of at least several of the petitioners’ arguments, and in the unjustified accusatory tone imputing malicious intent to the petitioners, the decision does indeed show objectionable bias.”
“Cancel the COC of Marcos Jr. (More)”—see:
https://oddsandendsgonzalinhodacosta.blogspot.com/2022/01/cancel-coc-of-marcos-jr-more.html
According to Dante Gatmaytan of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
The Comelec ended by saying that it “must see to it that its judgment is free from bias and partiality.” However, its ruling seems to have taken every step to favor Marcos Jr., by misusing case law and doctrines which, in the end, is a very partial approach to settling this issue.
https://opinion.inquirer.net/150041/reversing-the-comelec
—Dante Gatmaytan, “Reversing the Comelec,” Inquirer.net (February 19, 2022)
The step involving a Random Manual Audit (RMA) is reassuring as long as it is conducted by independent parties.
However, the RMA is conducted under direct COMELEC supervision.
See:
—Christia Marie Ramos, “‘We are here to erase doubts’: Comelec kicks off random manual audit of votes,” Inquirer.net (May 10, 2022)
Total VCMs in the 2022 elections equals 106,000. See:
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1591464/100-of-vote-counting-machines-already-distributed-comelec
—John Eric Mendoza, “All vote-counting machines for May 9 polls already distributed — Comelec,” Inquirer.net (May 3, 2022)
Ostensibly, a random sample of one percent of 106,000 VCMs, or 1,060 would be sufficient to catch any important discrepancies.
Presumably, the indicative one percent sample size is based on historical data that has been subjected to appropriate statistical analysis.
P.S. See comments about the RMA in the Comments section below.
Are the Smartmatic Secure and Digital (SD) cards vulnerable to tampering and fraud?
It has been alleged that the procedure followed by the Bids and Awards Committee for the 2010 elections was defective because Smartmatic won the contract despite the possibility that the Smartmatic WORM SD card used in testing was not write-protected and is therefore subject to prospective electoral tampering.
begin
The present vote counting machine (VCM) that the Comelec used and will be using in the upcoming 2022 national and local elections (NLE), is an improvement from its first version, the precinct count optical scanner (PCOS) machine that was used during the first automated elections in the Philippines in 2010. Both the PCOS and VCM were supplied by technology provider Smartmatic Inc.
…The PCOS machine has two card slots - one for the blue main CF card and another for the red backup CF card. CF stands for compact flash, another type of memory storage device. The main CF card contains three folders - the “dcf” folder, the “election” folder, and the “temp” folder. The transaction log files, statistical files, election results and other files are likewise stored in the blue card.
Timeframe analysis on the CF cards revealed an intriguing fact – almost all files were modified on May 10, 2010 (election day) but were last accessed on two other future dates, of which no plausible explanation was offered then. The CF cards should have been in “read only” mode after the PCOS shutdown.
Improved vote counting machine
The VCM supposedly addressed all the system defects and perceived flaws of the PCOS machine. With some technical modifications and system enhancements, the VCM essentially performs the same functions required of the PCOS machine.
Instead of CF cards, the VCMs use SD cards. The main card slot needs a regular SD card while the second card slot requires a WORM SD card.
During election day, as ballots are fed into and read by the VCM, ballot images and counts are written in the regular SD card. At the end of election day, the data back-up and results are written in the WORM SD card – with the intention of not accepting any more “write events” after that one and only writing. This is to ensure that the election results stored in the WORM SD card are not altered and tampered with once the VCM is shut down.
BAC formatted WORM SD card
It was alleged in the PII/PSI joint venture’s complaint that the bids and awards committee-technical working group (BAC-TWG) “proceeded to format the SD cards (main) and the WORM SD cards in the SBAC-AES TWG’s computer. The formatting of the WORM SD cards, however, was done despite a prior and clear manifestation made by Mr. Alfred S. Cayton, a representative of the joint venture, regarding the nature of a WORM SD card. Cayton explained that the WORM SD cards do not need further formatting because such act will be considered tampering with the WORM SD cards and will affect the operability of the WORM SD card.”
The reformatted WORM SD card, as expected, was rejected by the VCM, and relied upon by the BAC to disqualify the bid of the PII/PSI joint venture. Thereafter, the project was awarded to Smartmatic.
If this allegation is true, then it simply means that the VCM does not use a real WORM SD card. Pure logic dictates that if the VCM runs on a “formatted” WORM SD card, then the WORM SD card is no longer write-protected. If the card is not write-protected any more, then the results (or whatever digital information) stored in the card can be written over, modified, or altered without any restriction.
Legally, the supply of a “non-real” WORM SD card is a violation of the terms of reference of the project itself.
Technically, the data security from unauthorized alteration or modification at both the hardware and software levels, as afforded by a real WORM SD card, can no longer be assured.
Worse, this opens the possibility of post-election tampering.
end
—Al Vitangcol 3rd, “Smartmatic’s WORM SD card can be altered,” The Manila Times (June 5, 2021)
P.S. See “The Human Factor in Smartmatic Systems” in the Comments section below.
In principle, anytime COMELEC is itself the controller or auditor of the supply, storage, and distribution of the Smartmatic systems or its working parts before or during the electoral exercise—in this case, the 2022 elections—it is an arrangement that is vulnerable to sabotage by COMELEC insiders, their contractors, or both.
Furthermore, any audit of electoral steps vulnerable to tampering and fraud requires the participation of independent, technically competent civil society groups and representatives, for the audit to be credible and reassuring.
Not surprisingly, more than one civil society group has called for the introduction of manual audits at critical points in the electoral system.
begin
Election and information technology experts believe that using a hybrid election system instead of an automated election system (AES) is the Philippines’ best option in next year’s national poll.
Former Commission on Elections (Comelec) commissioner and current National Movement for Free Elections president Gus Lagman said shifting to hybrid polls, which entail manual counting and electronic canvassing and transmission of votes, would enhance the transparency and accuracy of election results.
“The advantage of hybrid is it enhances transparency and accuracy. All steps of election process are transparent, the precinct tally are seen by the voters. In PCOS (precinct count optical scan machines), you don’t see the tally and we accepts those results – nobody questions the results,” Lagman explained during the “Archer Talks” online forum on Friday.
“We wish that the Comelec would count the votes manually instead of just showing us the results without us finding out how the votes were counted. I’m recommending that the votes be counted manually but at the same time there should be assistance from a person with a laptop so that as the votes are being counted, one is added to the candidate that was just read from the ballot. So, manual and laptop-assisted,” he added.
Lagman pointed out that an AES costs the government P10 billion every election, while the hybrid system will only cost P300 million.
“Vulnerability to cheating is very low – only retail cheating if at all. Software use is open source and can be reviewed by anybody interested,” Lagman said.
Lagman cited that progressive countries like Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands and even some states in the United States have reverted to manual counting because automated counting is not transparent.
The only disadvantage, Lagman explained, is that tallying time will be 5 to 10 hours longer compared to using PCOS.
…Comelec Commissioner Rowena Guanzon said the proposal to use a hybrid election system in next year’s national polls was not feasible because the combination of manual voting and counting of votes, and automated canvassing and transmission would defeat the purpose of a speedy and credible elections.
Guanzon said the counting of votes for president and vice president alone, done manually, would take weeks or even a month to finish.
end
https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/08/01/news/national/experts-recommend-hybrid-polls-for-2022/1809270
—William B. Depasupil, “Experts recommend hybrid polls for 2022,” The Manila Times (August 1, 2021)
In a rejoinder to Guanzon’s argument we say, speedy, yes, credible, no.
The time required to manually audit votes in a hybrid system would be very substantially reduced if you resort to random sampling.
A census audit is not required.
All things considered, from the standpoint of transparent, accountable, truthful, and accurate electronic systems, COMELEC administration of the 2022 elections was deficient, suspicious, especially defective in control and audit, and in the last analysis, unsatisfactory.
Citing the Law of Large Numbers and historical data, Dylan Salcedo of Rappler has provided a satisfactory explanation for the invariant transmittal data broadcast by the COMELEC transparency server. See:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/forty-seven-percent-ratio-law-large-numbers-polls/
—Dylan Salcedo, “The ‘constant 47% ratio’ explained,” Rappler.com, May 11, 2022
The figures appearing in the record of VCM precinct transmittals to the transparency server are cumulative totals, not series data arithmetically unconnected. If it were the latter, the transmittals should show some reasonable variance.
Gonzalinho
Simply put, existing audit systems are inadequate to catch electronic cheating. If the government really wants to cheat, it’s going to be very difficult to spot and expose it.
ReplyDeleteGonzalinho
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) [Facebook post]
ReplyDeleteNagsimula na ang Random Manual Audit (RMA) noong May 11 at expected na magtatagal ito hanggang June 21 sa Diamond Hotel sa Manila.
Kasama sa Random Manual Audit Committee na magsasagawa ng RMA ang COMELEC, PSA, at Coalition of Civil Society Organizations (LENTE, NAMFREL, PICPA, PSPHP, ISACA).
Pero ano nga ba ang Random Manual Audit?
#NAMFREL #BantayNgBayan #2022NLE #Halalan2022 #Eleksyon2022
Comments:
Independent civil society organizations are represented in the RMA Committee.
Who samples the precincts for the RMA? The random sample generation should be automated and transparent.
Gonzalinho
THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SMARTMATIC SYSTEMS
ReplyDeleteA CNN Philippines article in 2016 identified two possible avenues for electronically adulterating Smartmatic electoral results: (1) rigging software code, and (2) preprogramming hardware chips and then switching them.
Miguel Avila of Smartmatic addressed the two possibilities.
1. Rigging Software Code
begin
Receipts generated by a test machine fed with test ballots were accurate. But what if the machines out in the field are programmed to cheat?
Miguel Avila, Pre-Sales Solutions Coordinator of Smartmatic, said it won’t happen because the software that runs the machines has gone through stringent reviews by both foreign and local experts and it passed, earning international and government certifications.
He said a hash code printed on the machines’ initialization and audit reports is the software’s fingerprint. A hash code is a unique series of letters and numbers produced by about 97,000 vote counting machines to be used in the elections. Once the software is tampered, the hash code changes. All you need to do then is compare this with the authentic hash code to determine if the software has been altered.
end
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/05/06/is-it-possible-to-rig-automated-elections.html
—JC Gotinga, “Is it possible to rig automated elections?” CNN Philippines, May 6, 2016
Expert audit of the software is indeed a critical control step. Is it foolproof?
Nothing is ever foolproof when it comes to software, especially when the software—which cannot be evaluated separately from the hardware—is complex.
Besides, theoretically, the hash code safeguard can be tampered with, however unlikely, because it is human beings who manufacture and manage the machines, which consist of software and hardware systems.
We might ask—who is responsible for manufacturing and managing the Smartmatic machines?
Answer: Smartmatic and COMELEC.
To be continued
Gonzalinho
THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SMARTMATIC SYSTEMS
DeleteContinued
2. Preprogramming Hardware Chips and Switching Them
begin
Memory card switching
Some observers say another way to cheat the automated polls is by switching official memory cards with ones loaded with fabricated results.
Former Biliran Rep. Glenn Chong claimed that was how he lost in the 2010 elections, but admits he has no proof to substantiate his suspicions.
“It is difficult to prove the electronic aspect of the cheating,” he said.
Avila dismisses Chong’s claims. He said there is no way a vote counting machine or canvassing laptop would read a fake memory card, adding each card bears the certified software and a unique digital signature specific to the machine it is designated for. He said each machine has a main memory card and a back-up.
He said the software and the digital signature can’t be replicated in any memory card, and a fake card can’t ever work.
If you’re able to get a card and program it, what program will you install there? Where will you get that program? So it is possible to get another card that’s meant for another machine and insert it there. And it would have the official source code in it but not the right digital signature that’s paired with the other card. So in that sense, the machine would already detect it and not read the card,” Avila said.
end
—Ibid.
It is reassuring that there are matching programs installed in the Smartmatic machine designed to preclude a chip that is customized for one machine being substituted by another fraudulent chip.
However, we observe that the human factor always comes into play in the design and implementation of information technology security systems.
It is human beings who manufacture and manage the Smartmatic machines. Insiders can sabotage the Smartmatic system, however unlikely. They can insidiously substitute machine-chip pairs.
We agree with the view of the information technology experts themselves that no information technology system is 100% foolproof.
“IT expert and poll reform advocate Toti Casino of the Philippine Computer Center said no matter how secure a system appears to be, there’s always a way to crack it.”
—Ibid.
Our own luridly tainted electoral history together with the complexity of present-day electoral systems practically inaccessible to the larger population argues against our complacency and calls us to exercise vigilance.
Gonzalinho
“Insiders can sabotage the Smartmatic system, however unlikely. They can insidiously substitute machine-chip pairs.”
DeleteThis electoral step is not subject to adequate audit.
Gonzalinho
HIJACKING VOTER IDENTITY
ReplyDeleteIn a February 12, 2019 Rappler article, Emil Marañon III pointed out that hijacking voter identity historically represented a major opportunity for electoral cheating.
begin
Verifying the voters’ identity
Another crucial aspect of the AES that has remained manual is the “voter verification.” This is the part where the members of the Electoral Boards (EBs) ascertain whether the person before them is the same voter who registered to vote in that precinct. Presently, when a voter presents himself to vote, he will be verified by asking his name and by counterchecking it with the Election Day Voter’s List (EDCVL). When there is a challenge as to his identity he will be asked to produce a proof of identity, registration, or qualification. Under the General Instruction, it is at this point where the EB “shall identify the voter’s specimen signature and photo in the EDCVL.” If the members of the Electoral Board are satisfied, he will be given a ballot and be allowed to vote.
The voter verification process is supposed to screen illegal voters and impostors. This aspect of the AES is the only discretion left to the members of the Electoral Board and, consequently, the automated system’s weak point. Members of the Electoral Boards can be forced, intimated, bribed or can simply collude with politicians and that’s it! This vulnerability has been exploited by election operators and cheaters since the 2010 elections.
This vulnerability is worsened by the voting machines’ inability to tell whether the person feeding the ballot is really the registered voter who cast the vote. This allowed the cheating scheme of “shading by one” or “feeding by one,” where one or few persons can technically vote for the whole precinct.
end
https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/222887-suggestions-making-comelec-voting-machines-less-vulnerable-cheating-elections-2019/
— Emil Marañon III, “[OPINION] How to make the automated elections less vulnerable to cheats,” Rappler.com, February 12, 2019
He argued that this opening for electoral cheating could be plugged by biometric identification.
begin
…the biometric information (that is, fingerprints) of all the registered voters of a particular precinct would be pre-loaded onto the precinct’s voter verification machine. Persons presenting themselves as the voter would be asked to input their fingerprints, and if there was a match, they would be given a ballot. A biometrics match would also be required before a filled-up ballot were to be accepted and read by the PCOS machine.
end
—Ibid.
To be continued
Gonzalinho
HIJACKING VOTER IDENTITY
DeleteContinued
However, as a solution, biometric identification presents its own design and implementation problems.
begin
…Quality of biometrics database crucial
One of the major issues that the Comelec will face is the quality and integrity of its biometrics database. The Comelec has been gathering biometrics data for more than a decade or perhaps longer. In that period, different biometrics capturing machines running on different software and from different suppliers had been used. Expectedly, they are of varying performance or accuracy. Also, different people had captured and handled the voters’ data, and different suppliers had been in charge of their storage, custody, and analysis.
During my time at the Comelec, we constantly received reports that a significant number of fingerprints in the former ARMM areas were found to be “smudgy” or intentionally made smudgy. There was also the prevalent use of the middle, ring, or pinky fingers, instead of the required thumb and index fingerprint to trick the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), which could detect duplication. Migration from one technology to technology supplier, if mishandled, could also affect data integrity. In other words, the inconsistency of the “quality” of the biometrics data is foreseeable and, in fact, confirmed by multiple sources.
To address or compensate for the problematic biometrics database, the Comelec or its VRVS supplier is expected to lower the so-called “Biometric Match Threshold” or BMT. This threshold pertains to the minimum degree of similarity between a pattern (biometric information of the person attempting to vote) and the biometric template preloaded in the VRVS that it will accept before declaring a “match.” The industry uses the word “scores” (or weights) to express the similarity between a pattern and a biometric template. The higher the “score” is, the higher is the similarity between them. The higher the score or similarity required, the higher the certainty that the person attempting to vote is really the voter registered in that precinct.
The quality of Comelec’s biometrics database will be crucial in setting this threshold. The dilemma is that imposing a higher threshold could lead to a higher rejection rate or prevalence of false rejections if Comelec’s biometrics database are of poor quality. The other option is to lower the threshold, but this could mean poor detection, thus a higher acceptance rate (or false acceptance). In a worst-case scenario, with a system adopting a low threshold, impostor patterns could be falsely accepted.
end
—Ibid.
Have we preempted hijacking voter identity in the current electoral system?
Testimonies from my friends and relatives say NO. They report, for example, that there are deceased voters who have not yet been purged from the COMELEC voter rolls.
Dead men tell no tales, but they still vote.
Gonzalinho
PPCRV MANUAL AUDIT OF TRANSPARENCY SERVER ELECTRONIC RECEIPTS
ReplyDeleteTo detect and preclude possible dagdag-bawas in the electronic transmission of voter counting machine (VCM) precinct results to the COMELEC transparency server, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) conducts its own separate manual audit of the hard copies of the VCM results.
begin
“To explain to the public, what we are doing is to answer that ever-big question and doubt in their mind, ‘what happens to my ballot after I stick it into the VCM (vote-counting machine)?’ Nobody sees that right?” PPCRV chair Myla Villanueva told CNN Philippines' The Source on Thursday.
“So to alleviate and assuage that concern, this process in UST (University of Santo Tomas) is assuring that no dagdag-bawas [cheating] is happening. There was not a hack and things are as it should be,” she added.
The PPCRV is entitled to the fourth copy of the transmitted election returns from the VCMs. Results are manually encoded to check if these match with the electronic results from the Comelec transparency server.
…In 2019, the election returns that they verified matched the data in the transparency server by 99.98%.
end
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/5/12/PPCRV-volunteers-elections.html
—CNN Philippines Staff, “EXPLAINER: What PPCRV volunteers do after May 9 polls,” CNN Philippines, May 12, 2022
Gonzalinho
The PPCRV audit is necessary to catch fraud in the transmittal to the transparency server.
ReplyDeleteThe RMA if it’s done properly should catch VCM programming fraud.
The SD chips can be fraudulently programmed but if the RMA ballots are not doctored you can check them against the VCM output. That’s supposed to be the purpose of the RMA, which finishes at the last week of June.
What should be watched carefully is how the RMA is done.
Gonzalinho
DANGEROUS GAPS IN THE 2022 ELECTORAL SYSTEM
ReplyDelete…Listen to what info-technologists and election experts say. Voters will see that May 9 was a flawed automated election – again. As in 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019, provisions of the Automated Election Systems (AES) Law were unmet.
That law provides for an unbroken chain of safeguards and processes. “But there were too many gaps,” says Nelson Celis, PhD, of AES Watch. Among these were in:
(1) Digital signatures – Last March 23 Celis and National Press Club president Paul Gutierrez petitioned the Supreme Court. “Command the Comelec to assign digital signatures (passcodes) to the three election inspectors per precinct.” This was after Comelec said only those in Metro Manila, Cebu City and Davao City would be assigned passcodes from the roster of the Dept. of Information and Communications Technology. In the rest of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao only the chairmen were to be given passcodes, not the two others. For authentication, three digital signatures must be keyed in to boot each of the 106,000 VCMs and transmit election returns (ERs). With only one signatory, any fraud can happen at precincts. The SC issued no mandamus.
(2) Monitoring of ballot printing and SD (secure digital) card formatting – Citing pandemic restrictions, Comelec disallowed monitoring by party reps and election watchdogs until after 70 percent of ballots already were printed. Pray that the ballots were untampered. One Filipino info-technologist reported to Comelec on March 22 when refused entry to witness the SD card formatting at the VCM warehouse. No action taken, Celis says.
(3) Documented results – Section 11 of the AES Law requires Comelec to release six findings 90 days before E-Day or Feb. 9. Those are: field test and mock election; audit of accuracy, functionality and security controls of AES software; source code review of VCMs, transmission router, consolidation/canvassing system; certification that the source codes are kept in escrow at the Bangko Sentral; certification that the reviewed source codes are those used by the equipment; and a continuity plan to avoid failure of elections at voting, counting or consolidation. Comelec resolved to release these only on May 6, three days before E-Day, stating that some findings were received only the previous day. It posted the resolution on May 11, two days after E-Day; the links to the findings cannot be opened or accessed. No Filipino IT expert was able to review it.
(4) Source code review of central, backup and transparency servers – A reputable international body must certify the source codes, in this case Pro V&V of America, 90 days before E-Day. Comelec must release details for scrutiny by Filipino experts as it did in 2010 with then-certifier SysTest Labs. Only then can Comelec issue a trusted-build, or executable file to run the VCMs and servers. Comelec issued a trusted-build in January and revised it in February. Source code reviews went on till April. “Reviewers say there were third and fourth revisions,” Celis remarks.
(5) Check of ERs versus transparency server – The tally of precinct ERs must jibe 100 percent with the transparency server because all came from the same 106,000 VCMs. But because of gaps in the four above processes, there could be variants. Watchdog Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting did report 1.6 percent difference between its tally and the Comelec server. That represents 1,696 precinct VCMs or 1,356,800 votes. Could there be more, asks former DICT secretary Eliseo Rio.
To be continued
Gonzalinho
DANGEROUS GAPS IN THE 2022 ELECTORAL SYSTEM
DeleteContinued
(6) Random manual audit (RMA) – Ballots in 759 precincts, one per district or 607,200 votes, are to be manually checked against the ERs. Those must be chosen publicly by tambiolo at the close of balloting. Precinct inspectors must then commence audits, observed by party reps, watchdogs and voters. Since 2013 the selection has been behind closed doors. This 2022 Comelec did it via an Automated Random Selection Program in a laptop. Celis and Rio doubt if the ARSP source code was reviewed at all. The RMA is being held in a Manila venue. Comelec gave field offices two to five days to send over the ballot boxes. Who will transport the boxes? Are those properly sealed and padlocked? The RMA supervisor, watchdog National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, does not know the logistics firm; nor does it hold the padlock keys. “The teacher-auditors are in a bubble; they’re incommunicado,” says Namfrel chairman Gus Lagman, also former Comelec commissioner.
All these dent the credibility of Election 2022.
But there’s a remedy. Publicly re-select the 759 precincts. To shorten the time, prepare one tambiolo for each region. Open the audit to the public.
https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2022/05/18/2181925/last-credibility-checkrandom-manual-audit
—Jarius Bondoc, “OPINION: Last credibility check: random manual audit,” philstar GLOBAL, May 18, 2022
Comments:
Because I am not an information technology expert, I can’t comment meaningfully on (1) to (4).
However, it doesn’t require information technology expertise to understand the lapses cited, including COMELEC’s failure to allow the audit of the printing of 70 percent of the ballots as well as its negligence in not making accessible to information technology experts the results of the electoral controls that had been implemented pursuant to Section 11 of the Automated Election Systems Law.
Because the 1.6 percent difference discovered by the PPCRV audit that was reported in (5) would be significant in close races, it behooves the COMELEC to identify the source of the discrepancy besides officially resolving it.
The Random Manual Audit reported in (6) is defective. The lack of an information technology review of the Automated Random Selection Program is a significant slip, together with the absence or lack of transparency in running the random numbers program and in transporting the ballot boxes from the randomly selected precincts to the Manila venue.
Gonzalinho
ELECTIONS NOT FREE AND FAIR
ReplyDeleteThe election was “not free and fair”.
Séverine De Laveleye, a Belgian parliamentarian, said this as she presented the interim report of the International Observer Mission (IOM) on the May 9 elections.
The IOM, which was launched by the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines on Feb. 7 as a response to InvestigatePH’s recommendation last year, had observed the 2022 elections.
De Laveleye, who is an IOM commissioner, said the election was “marred by a higher level of failure of the electronic voting system than ever before,” saying that these were likewise observed:
• Rampant vote-buying
• Disturbing levels of state and military-orchestrated red-tagging
• Incidents of deadly violence
The IOM had monitored the election since February, the start of the 90-day campaign period.
…The report, which was released on Thursday (May 19), were based on six IOM Bulletins issued since March, compiled from documentations made by international observers, reports from overseas Filipinos, background from IOM’s local partner—Kontra Daya—and the team of writers which monitored the mainstream media and credible online output which could be verified.
The findings
The IOM said the election “did not meet the standard of free and fair [election] because of these prevailing conditions that robbed the voters of access to reliable information, access to the voting places without intimidation, and a credible vote counting system”.
De Laveleye said the widespread irregularities and violence undermined the democratic process that “took place in the most repressive context since the time of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos”.
…Problem with AES
Dr. Maria Lourdes Jarabe, a convenor of Kontra Daya, IOM’s local partner, said “it is actually difficult for voters to be confident in election proceedings marred by machine errors and breakdowns as these cast doubt on the capacity of the machine to count their votes”.
Kontra Daya, together with VoteReportPH, gathered reports involving machine errors, illegal campaigning, vote-buying and red-tagging. Jarabe said they received more than 9,000 reports and they were able to verify 2,927.
Election-related: 2,683
1. VCM & SD Card errors: 52.3%
2. Electioneering: 14%
3. Election process-related: 11.2%
Campaign-related: 224
1. Vote-buying: 29%
2. Red-tagging: 24.1%
3. Disinformation: 17%
To be continued
Gonzalinho
ELECTIONS NOT FREE AND FAIR
DeleteContinued
“The machine failures make up a significant percentage of the election incidents–machines rejecting the ballots, failure to issue receipts, or breaking down completely, resulting in long lines and significant delays in voting,” she said.
De Laveleye said it was widely reported that more than 1,800 VCMs malfunctioned, affecting 1.1 million voters.
Jarabe, who is a professor at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila and a former official of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, said “Kontra Daya has remained critical of the conduct of automated elections in the country for its lack of transparency and accountability”.
“The proprietary source codes of the VCMs and the lack of genuine source code review process cast more doubt on the accuracy of election results,” she said, stressing that with the fact that “we were not given access to understand how the VCMs work”.
Read more: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/?p=1600309#ixzz7Txz3Ugrz
—Kurt Dela Peña, “Int’l observers: May 9 PH vote falls short of free, fair election standards,” Inquirer.net, May 20, 2022
Gaps in the Automated Election Systems (AES) that allow the COMELEC or its assigns to tamper with the system—whether software, hardware, or both—including gaps in the system audit, do not allow us to profess full confidence in the integrity of the AES.
Gonzalinho
A known supporter of former Vice President Leni Robredo has addressed the proverbial elephant in the room, one that many opposition supporters have found difficult to acknowledge: that there was no massive fraud that happened in the 2022 presidential elections.
ReplyDeleteFormer Tourism Undersecretary Vicente Romano III said on Thursday, during the launch of his book, “From the Heart: How I Became Social Media Influencer at Age 65” shared that when he acknowledged that Robredo’s presidential bid was over just a day after unofficial results came in, his followers were dismayed.
However, reading a part of his book, he explained that he had been monitoring the conspiracy theories about Robredo getting cheated, noting that all of the points raised by the former vice president’s supporters could be addressed.
Instead, the elections really reflected the choice of the people — as what major polling firms and even their internal surveys had expected.
“Some of my friends and followers were disappointed, even resentful that I gave up so easily. After all there were still some reports of electoral fraud that might yet invalidate the unofficial count […] But I’ve been monitoring the supposed or the reported incidents of fraud and other conspiracy theories moving around in social media, and many of them could be explained […] There simply was no smoking gun evidence that pointed to any large-scale systematic fraud,” he said.
“There might have been massive vote buying, disenfranchisement and other irregularities, more than the usual presidential elections, but I don’t think that it was on a scale that would alter the results. The results — BBM at 58 (percent), VP Leni at 29 (percent), reflected what the surveys of major pollsters […] and even our own internal surveys have been saying,” he added.
…He also noted that attempts to rely on Google Trends as a polling and sampling method was just “trash”.
“BBM was spot on, our numbers may have surged by around five points — the effect perhaps of our last minute house-to-house efforts. Sadly, too little, too late. The false narratives that they have planted in the last decade have taken roots, and it was just impossible to demolish them within the eight-month campaign period,” he claimed.
“Google Trends was simply trash. Bottomline is, it is what it is. The sooner we accept it, the sooner we are able to overcome our grief and plan on improvements,” he added.
To be continued
Continued
DeleteRobredo suffered a massive defeat in the 2022 presidential bid, losing to eventual winner and now President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Official tallies showed that Marcos obtained over 31 million votes, while Robredo only got 15 million.
…The former vice president never conceded, but she told her supporters several times to accept the results of the elections.
During the campaign season, Robredo supporters were optimistic that huge rallies would deliver for them, as they regularly attracted over 100,000 of supporters per grand rally around mid-to-late April.
They also relied heavily on figures from Google Trends, even as polling mainstays Pulse Asia and Social Weather Stations indicated an overwhelming Marcos victory. Robredo supporters noted that top searches in Google Trends usually ended up winning an election in other countries.
However, there were several observers, including literary critic Katrina Stuart Santiago, who reminded the opposition that Google Trends are not indicative of voter preference, as they merely show which terms are being searched the most.
Romano said he understands that it may be difficult to accept the results for many, but it is what it is.
“I think most of you will agree na ‘yong isang very difficult to accept was ‘yong disconnect between what was happening in our rallies, and the survey results. Tama ba? Grabe ‘di ba? Ang layo no’ng diperensya, and sometimes a lot of us actually began questioning ‘yong surveys,” he said.
…“But the truth is, again, tama ‘yong surveys eh, ‘yon talaga ‘yong pinapaniwalaan ng mga tao, they were very successful in refurbishing the Marcos image,” he added.
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1672900/leni-supporter-tackles-elephant-in-room-no-massive-fraud-in-2022-polls-surveys-were-just-right
—Gabriel Pabico Lalu, “Robredo supporter tackles elephant in room: No massive fraud in 2022 polls, surveys were just right,” Inquirer.net, September 29, 2022
No smoking gun.
Gonzalinho
Seven months after the May 9 elections, former vice president Leni Robredo addressed the question that her supporters had been asking since she lost the presidential race to Ferdinand Marcos Jr.: Why didn’t she file an electoral protest?
ReplyDeleteSpeaking at a gathering in New York City on Wednesday, December 7, Robredo said it was because her legal team and a group of IT experts didn’t find evidence of cheating. She clarified that this was not to say no cheating took place, it was just that no evidence could be found to substantiate cheating allegations.
Emil Marañon III, one of the election lawyers who worked for Robredo during the May elections, highlighted this in a tweet on Friday, December 9, complementing a video of Robredo explaining why her camp did not protest the election results.
“Finally, you heard it straight from the principal. Trust me, we started with disbelief [about the results] and we are dying to find something to answer the call of the supporters [to protest], but there was none. The numbers checked,” Marañon said.
…In the interview, Robredo instead says she and her team couldn’t find evidence of cheating in the elections.
…Robredo said they did not find evidence of cheating: “We participated in all the third party audits that were conducted, and our lawyers and our computer experts did not see anything. Ayaw po namin na mag-file ng kaso na papaasahin lang kayo (We don’t want to file a case only to keep your hopes up).”
…The former vice president also clarified that she did not say there was no cheating at all, only that they did not find evidence of it.
“Hindi ko po sinasabing walang dayaan na nangyari. Ang sinasabi ko lang, walang nakita. Walang nakita ‘yong ating mga teams,” Robredo explained. (I am not saying there is no cheating that happened. What I am saying is, we did not see anything. Our teams did not see anything.)
https://www.rappler.com/nation/robredo-says-did-not-see-evidence-2022-elections/
—Jairo Bolledo, “Robredo: We did not see evidence of cheating in 2022 elections,” Rappler.com, December 9, 2022
If cheating took place, it was apparently not of sufficient magnitude to change the electoral outcome for president.
Gonzalinho
THE SMOKING GUN
ReplyDeleteIn their separate judicial affidavits, three petitioners for a writ of mandamus filed before the Supreme Court swore and stated the gist of their petition:
“I hope the Supreme Court will promulgate a politically neutral provisional remedy, as soon as possible, before the 9th of November 2022, directing the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the telecommunications companies (DITO Telecommunity and Globe Telecom and Smart Communications) to preserve the subscriber and cyber traffic data integrity of the national election results transmitted from 7 p.m. to at least 9 p.m. of May 09, 2022.” This is also in the title of the petition for mandamus filed with the Supreme Court on Nov. 3, 2022.
The petitioners are Augusto Cadelina Lagman, Eliseo Mijares Rio Jr., and Franklin Fayloga Ysaac. Lagman is former chair of election watchdog National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections and president of Philippine Computer Society. Rio is former Department of Information and Communications Technology secretary. Ysaac is former president of the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines. In social media, they are called TNTrio.
…I have a copy of the 100-page petition for mandamus, much of which are supporting documents, showing proofs of the petition’s urgency and the “smoking guns.” It also includes a list of letters, pleadings, and affidavits pertinent to the case that show “procedures rendering improbable (almost impossible) transmission of election result within an hour from closing of polls.”
In simple words: How did an avalanche of election results favoring presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr. get transmitted in so short a time? The “witching hour”—to use Halloween parlance—was 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. of May 9, 2022, but most especially between 7 p.m. and 7:17 p.m. or thereabouts.
…The mandamus petition may look intimidating because of the legalese and technicalese, but it really boils down to this, in the words of lawyer Oswald Magno, forum moderator in Toronto: “The uncanny speed of vote reporting plus the statistically improbable constant vote ratio among the presidential candidates is the smoking gun.”
The petition couldn’t be more direct: “If Comelec cannot show the public that at least 2,000 transmission reports were received electronically that have the date/time stamp between 7:00 pm and 7:17 pm as of May 9, 2022 then the only conclusion that can be derived is that such numbers were preloaded into the transparency and/or Comelec servers.” Preloaded, remember the word.
“We challenge Comelec to demonstrate to the public that all activities required in its General Instructions, including the printing of the election return (ER), can be done in less than 17 minutes before any transmission is made … We further appeal to the poll watchdog Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting to tell the public whether, in their manual count of the printed ERs given to them, they could account for at least 2,000 Transmission Reports of ERs with date/time stamps between 7 p.m. and 7:17 p.m. If none of these can be shown or proven, then the data being shown in the Transparency Server is fraudulent from the very beginning.”
The mandamus petition also showed, through dazzling graphs and charts, how “mathematically, logically, and statistically highly improbable if not impossible” the initial Comelec results were.
https://opinion.inquirer.net/162075/via-crucis-sc-petition-with-smoking-gun#ixzz7xZw1U7CD
—Ma. Ceres P. Doyo, “Via crucis: SC petition with smoking gun,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 31, 2023)
We found it—the smoking gun. It’s Marcos’ legacy of massive cheating at elections followed by plunder and political instability, courtesy of Duterte and Marcos Jr.
Gonzalinho