Maria Ressa and Rappler: A Case of Legalism in Support of Unethical Decisions

Maria Ressa

MARIA RESSA AND RAPPLER: A CASE OF LEGALISM IN SUPPORT OF
UNETHICAL DECISIONS

A NAUSEOUS VERDICT, AN IGNORANT JUDGE
By: John Nery - @jnery_newsstand
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 04:04 AM June 16, 2020

…The Consortium on Democracy and Disinformation condemns the unjust, uncomprehending, unconstitutional decision in the cyberlibel case against Maria Ressa, Reynaldo Santos Jr., and Rappler. Presiding Judge Rainelda Estacio-Montesa of the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 46 has failed the Constitution, the rule of law, and the country’s long and proud tradition of defending the freedom of the press.

The decision was UNCOMPREHENDING, because the language of the decision proved that the court failed to understand how journalism works and what its role in a democratic setting is. Of the many microaggressions against the institution of the free press visible in the ruling, let this example suffice. “To the mind of the Court, Rappler’s scheme of not using the term ‘editor-in-chief’ in its organizational structure is a clever ruse to avoid liability of the officers of the news organization… They used the nomenclature ‘executive editor’ instead.” This is just unfortunate, and we wish Judge Estacio-Montesa, who must have been aware that she was in charge of a case that had drawn worldwide attention, could have reminded herself to use Google. The top editors of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and many other newspapers and news sites around the world are called “executive editor.” This “nomenclature” may be new to her, but it is not limited to Rappler and, it is in fact so commonplace that to declare it “a clever ruse” to avoid liability shows Judge Estacio-Montesa’s apparent unfamiliarity with the terrain that is journalism.

The decision was UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In her peroration, Judge Estacio-Montesa sought to explain her decision as a striking of the balance: “The right to free speech and freedom of the press cannot and should not be used as a shield against accountability.” True enough, but in scouring through Philippine and even American jurisprudence, she found only those passages that emphasized the responsibilities of the press—not the fundamental importance of a free press in the functioning of a democratic society. Deliberately or inadvertently, she sounded like she was arguing that the court was the gatekeeper of journalistic standards. But when free speech and freedom of the press are at issue, the bar for considering any restriction must be set very high—not because journalists are privileged persons, but because the freedoms at stake are used by everyone. Thus, in ruling against a news organization on flimsy grounds, and in extending the coverage of the Cybercrime Prevention Act backward in time without so much as a chastened sense of responsibility or reflection, Judge Estacio-Montesa helped turn the rule of law into a weapon—and puts us, every single one of us who uses online and social media, in peril.

The decision was UNJUST, because the crux of the court’s reasoning was based on a falsehood. For the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which became law in September 2012, to apply to the Rappler story published four months before, in May 2012, the court had to resort to the legal doctrine of republication. The court said the “update” to the article made in February 2014 satisfied that doctrine. “The court considers the update a republication of the article.” But Rappler testified that it was only a mere correction of a misspelling: “evasion” had been spelled “evation.” Judge Estacio-Montesa sweeps this all away with an appalling display of ignorance: “the original article published on 29 May 2012 can no longer be found. Only the 19 February 2014 version presently exists and [is] accessible on the internet.” But this is false. In fact the original article can still be found, through resources such as the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, a long-standing repository of web pages. And sure enough, anyone—including Judge Estacio-Montesa, who lectures on cybercrimes—can find the original article there, where the word “evation” can be easily seen.

Despite quoting the great Nelson Mandela, Judge Estacio-Montesa through her decision has set us back on our own long walk to freedom.


“I TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH THE DECISION”
By Atty. Mel Sta. Maria
Dean, FEU Institute of Law
Posted on Facebook, June 15, 2020

If the crime of libel has indeed been committed, it prescribed some time ago.

I TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH THE DECISION. Prescinding from the merits of the case, Maria Ressa’s case should not have been filed in the first place. The filing of the case already prescribed before it was filed. It was a non-case from the very beginning.

Again let me state my reasons. I disagree with the Decision that a pre-war law Act No. 3326 is controlling. WHEN the 2012 Cybercrime Law was questioned in the Supreme Court, I was one of the petitioners. The SC’s decision is clear. Cyber-libel in the Cybercrime Law on libel is NOT A NEW CRIME but merely provides a manner of committing an already existing offense—which is libel—under the 1932 Revised Penal Code (RPC). The SC ruled:

“The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is ACTUALLY NOT A NEW CRIME since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes ‘similar means’ for committing libel.” ( Disini et al vs. Secretary of Justice et al G.R. No 203335 - 203518 February 11, 2014)

How does that decision affect the charge against Maria Ressa? That decision, among others, should be one of the reasons for Maria Ressa’s acquittal. Why? That can easily be explained.

First, because Cyber-libel is not a new crime, then the one year prescriptive period specially provided in the RPC applies to it. Moreover, such prescriptive period was not directly and expressly changed by the new Cybercrime Law. Again, cybercrime libel “MERELY AFFIRMS” an existing law. The Supreme Court made that ruling in 2014 and it must be considered part of the law of the land embedded in the Cybercrime law since its promulgation in 2012. All cyber-libel cases must abide by that ruling, including those filed in 2017.

The RTC said that the cyberlibel is “an offense separate and distinct from the ordinary libel.” However the SC clearly said cyberlibel is “ACTUALLY NOT A NEW CRIME.” The Supreme Court was very precise in the Disini case in this regard. [The] plain explanation cannot be misinterpreted. Judges must not deviate from SC decisions. A manner of committing a crime is not a new crime, just like murder being committed in so many ways, but there is only one crime. And depending on the circumstances, the penalty may be mitigated or aggravated, resulting [in] different penalties.

Second, an old 1924 pre-Commonwealth era and pre-Second-World War law (Act No. 3326 used by the DOJ and the RTC) stating that a 12-year-prescriptive period applied to statutes without a prescriptive period DOES NOT APPLY TO offenses under the REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) because the RPC totally repealed the OLD PENAL CODE (for which ACT 3326 was made specially applicable).

More importantly, the RPC specifically provides that libel should be filed within one year from its commission. Any Supreme Court interpretation of this prescriptive period making it a longer time, if such interpretation has been issued after 2017, say in 2018, will only be prospective in application, and cannot apply to cases filed in 2017. Judicial decisions are prospective in application (Co vs. CA G.R. No. 10076, October 28, 1993). Anything less than a decision, say a resolution, does not count as only a decision forms part of the law of the land. And if the resolution is unsigned, it is binding only between the parties and “has no significant doctrinal value; or is minimal interest to the law profession, the academe, or the public.” (Rule 13, Section 6 (c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court)

Third, since the alleged offense of Maria Ressa was committed in 2014 (assuming that the republication was the starting point) and the case was filed in 2017, clearly the crime (assuming there was a crime) already prescribed. It cannot be filed in 2017.

Fourth, at the very least, if there is an ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of criminal and related statutes, the interpretation must always lean toward upholding the presumption of innocence. It cannot be otherwise.

I truly believe that the court got this wrong.

MARIA RESSA SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED.

GRIEVOUS BLOW TO PHILIPPINE PRESS
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 04:08 AM June 16, 2020

Philippine journalism took a grievous blow yesterday with the conviction of Rappler CEO and executive editor Maria Ressa and former researcher-writer Reynaldo Santos Jr. on a case that stemmed from a cyberlibel complaint filed by businessman Wilfredo Keng.

…The NBI’s cybercrime division actually threw out the complaint, citing the one-year prescription period as provided in the Revised Penal Code. But a year later, the Department of Justice pronounced that liability for cyberlibel could extend to 12 years. DOJ prosecutors filed the charges on the basis of Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, which was enacted in September 2012 — or four months after the article was first posted.

…“If Maria Ressa is convicted,” Steven Butler, Asia program coordinator of the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists, said earlier, “it would amount to a threat to every working journalist in the Philippines, and, therefore, would undermine press freedom.”

He added: “It’s absurd that a journalist could be prosecuted, much less found guilty, under a law that was enacted only after the alleged misconduct took place.”

…Filipinos should take more than a passing interest in this guilty verdict that, according to Nicholas Bequelin, regional director of Amnesty International in the Asia-Pacific, “is a sham and should be quashed.” It is not only journalists that are at risk with the conviction of Ressa and Santos for the report on the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona’s supposed questionable association with Keng. Anyone writing online that offends powerful people are in danger of being sued within 12 years of their posting; the danger becomes greater in a progressively shrinking democratic space where the law becomes a handy weapon to wield against perceived offenders.


OPEN SEASON ON THE FREE PRESS
By: Randy David - @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:25 AM June 21, 2020

… All web-based news sites routinely “update” their past posts—typically to correct misspellings and typo errors. These updated or corrected versions are not republished as part of the news of the day. They remain in the archives, available as reference, the way an old newspaper issue might be summoned from the stacks of a library.

It would be stupid for any news site to rerun a stale report. “A news item run twice might still have its meaning, but it loses its information value,” writes Niklas Luhmann in “The Reality of the Mass Media.” There’s an ocean of difference between “updating” and “republishing”—but the court chose to ignore this.

You can’t argue with willful blindness; it is a sign someone else is overseeing the process.



When a retweet, a repost, a “liked” social media post, my goodness—a screenshot, can get you sued and possibly land you in jail…When you can’t freely say your piece without looking over your shoulder…Can you still truly say there is free speech?

Barnaby Lo, @barnabychuck
Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 22, 2020)

“Judge Montesa’s Appalling Decision,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 16, 2020) by Manuel L. Quezon III:


“Rappler Case: Where’s the Malice?” Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 21, 2020) by Ma. Ceres P. Doyo:


“Philippine Libel Law Violates International Law,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 22, 2020) by Joel Ruiz Butuyan:


In the Ressa case, I am willing to accept the possibility that the facts fit the definition of the crime, and this is the angle the administration plays on.

I am not willing to accept the violation of a foundational legal principle, the prohibition against the retrospective application of a law, especially a criminal law. I would guess that the majority of the population is ignorant of this principle—that is why lawyers should be there to protect them, not to take advantage of their ignorance, which is what happens when the law is weaponized by those in power.

During the Marcos period, it is very apparent that political context had a powerful effect on the judicial outcomes and on the judicial reasoning itself. The same situation obtains here, and the judicial reasoning in the Ressa case should, I repeat, be read in the current political context of Duterte's habit of political vengeance. In this context, the decision lacks integrity.

The reasoning, on its face, is specious. The crime has prescribed, and you cannot claim republication of the article on the basis of a tiny spelling correction. Bad decision, abominable precedent.

Unfortunately, in instruction at law school, it is the study of decisions like the Ressa case that teaches students that you can twist the law to accomplish any conclusion that you want. One of the main reasons why I left law school is that students are instructed in casuistry sometimes entirely separated from any cogent ethics. The study of law in this country—it is not so in other countries—teaches students to use the law as a tool to entrench the power of politico-economic elites. One way of entrenching the power of the ruling class in this case is by weaponizing the law to persecute and quash the opposition and to buttress dictatorship.

The law should be used to promote salutary democratic values—fundamental values like human rights and the rule of law, for example, both of which are moral imperatives convergent with the teachings of the Roman Catholic faith. Therefore, I seriously question—and doubt—the genuine religion of those Roman Catholics who use the law to advance the opposite.

The following post contains some excellent sources explaining why the Ressa verdict, which is accomplished by weaponizing the law, controverting sound and established legal principles, and ultimately, seriously weakening the rule of law, has destructive economic repercussions. It goes to the heart of why the Ressa decision is a bad decision: it undermines the rule of law and degrades economic development.


“Politicization of the judiciary undermines the impartiality, integrity, and equity that necessarily define the sound administration of justice.”

“The law weaponized against the legitimate political opposition is the misrule of law.”

“There is no economy. There is only political economy.”


Democracy, of which the rule of law is a constitutive part, in the advancement of good governance has directly positive economic effects on development.

In the Philippines, dictatorship is anti-development because it is joined to cronyism and plunder, with concomitant negative economic repercussions, gravely so. In this respect, it is immoral.

“Fascism with Filipino Characteristics”:

Comments

  1. Photo courtesy of Joshua Lim (Sky Harbor)

    Photo link: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maria_Ressa.jpg

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  2. WHAT’S MISSING IN JUDGE MONTESA’S SUMMARY
    By: John Nery - @jnery_newsstand
    Philippine Daily Inquirer / 04:07 AM June 23, 2020

    …A lawyer who used to work in the Supreme Court told me as much: “Never mind the summary of evidence. But the interpretation of the law? I don’t know.”

    It is true that the real problem — for both Ressa and Santos and for ordinary citizens — lies with the way the law was misinterpreted. The judge enabled a law to extend backward in time, in violation of the Constitution’s clear prohibition on ex post facto laws; and she extended the prescription period from one year to 12 years, again by going back in time, misusing a 1926 law to treat cyberlibel as a new crime.

    But I would also like to contest the fairness of Judge Montesa’s summary of the facts.

    …The real problem with the factual basis laid out in the decision lies in what is NOT included in the summary. Three points.

    First. …the complainant, through his own testimony, has made the case that he is in fact a “public figure.”

    …as the Supreme Court also ruled in Borjal v. CA, even if the private respondent did not qualify as a public figure, “it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue.”

    There’s the rub. The summary of facts that Judge Montesa wrote was eerily silent on the public issue at stake. …The summary of facts as remembered by Judge Montesa, however, or her own discussion of the legal issues, did not refer to the public interest at stake in the story. That context is a material fact, and was a public issue in which the complainant was involved.

    Second. The summary of facts…simply assumed that his testimony was accurate. This was a mistake, because the complainant sometimes gaslighted the court. For instance:

    “In fact, his eldest daughter, Patricia, who ran as a nominee of the Wow Pilipinas Partylist…lost the contest by a narrow margin. Since they were previously confident that she would win, due to the massive support of her followers, he believes her loss was due to the statements the accused published against him in the article.”

    …The judge could have asked for proof that the story had become an issue during the campaign, but sadly just took the complainant at his low-key word.

    Third. …What she did not include in her summary was the most important context of all: The complainant waited to act on his reputational damage, past the usual prescription period, until a new presidency was in place.

    Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/131056/whats-missing-in-judge-montesas-summary#ixzz6RITDGI9V

    If the crime of libel has indeed been committed, it prescribed some time ago.

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  3. DUTERTE ADMINISTRATION IS THE SWORN ENEMY OF TRUTH

    ...We ought to remind ourselves that the freedom of the press is not for the benefit of journalists and their organizations: IT IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE. The media are the people’s surrogates. They go where the people fear to go; they ask the questions the people are too timid to ask; they investigate what are concealed from the people. A free media is, and should remain, the people’s primary source of truth and information.

    Sr. Mary John Mananzan, convenor, Movement Against Tyranny
    Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 24, 2020)

    Democracy is not a spectator sport.

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  4. WHEN DOES CYBER-LIBEL PRESCRIBE?
    By: Antonio T. Carpio - @inquirerdotnet
    Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:05 AM June 25, 2020

    The overriding issue in the Rappler case is the prescriptive period of cyberlibel. There are two competing legal theories on the prescriptive period of cyberlibel.

    …I subscribe to the one-year theory for three reasons. First, in the 2014 case of Disini v. Secretary of Justice involving the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the Supreme Court en banc ruled that “cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353 of the penal code, in relation to Article 355, already punishes it.” Under Article 355, libel is committed by means of “writing, printing xxx or any other similar means.” The Court ruled that “online defamation constitutes ‘similar means’ of committing libel.” Thus, the prescriptive period of one year in the RPC applies to cyberlibel since it is an offense defined and penalized in the Code.

    Second, Act No. 3326 cannot be applied to crimes defined and penalized in the RPC. Act No. 3326 applies only to special laws, and its Section 3 expressly provides that “special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.” Clearly, by an express provision in Act No. 3326 itself, the Act shall apply only to crimes “not included in the Penal Code.” Thus, Act No. 3326 is not applicable to cyberlibel, which the Supreme Court en banc, in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, ruled is defined and penalized in the RPC.

    Third, the prescriptive periods in Article 90 of the RPC are classified into two: those based on the length or nature of the penalty, and those based on the crime itself regardless of the length or nature of the penalty. Under the first classification are, among others, crimes punishable by correctional penalty which prescribe in 10 years. Under the second classification are, among others, “libel and similar offenses” which prescribe in one year.

    The length of the penalty of libel is six months and one day to six years which is a correctional penalty with a prescriptive period of 10 years. However, Article 90 has expressly prescribed a prescriptive period of only one year for libel, down from two years prior to the 1966 amendment effected by RA No. 4661. Contrary to the minute resolution of the Supreme Court’s First Division in Tolentino v. People of the Philippines, whatever is the length of the penalty of libel or cyberlibel, the prescriptive period will always remain at one year because this is what Article 90 expressly provides—“the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.”

    acarpio@inquirer.com.ph

    Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/131118/when-does-cyberlibel-prescribe#ixzz6RIan9ES3

    Cogent arguments conclude that the alleged crime of libel in the Ressa case has prescribed. Only the casuistry of a pretzel argues otherwise.

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  5. “A Thousand Cuts – A Review” by Atty. Alexis Medina

    https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/crossroads-by-jonathan-dela-cruz/326440/-a-thousand-cuts-a-review.html

    Response: A Case of Legalism in Support of Immorality

    Atty. Medina advances what is basically an ad hominem argument. It's always easy to create another spin about the same event that favors a political side.

    What is genuinely at issue here is principles, not persons.

    The real issue in the Maria Ressa case is the weaponization of the law in repression of freedom of the press and in furtherance of dictatorship. The casualty is freedom of the press and the rule of law. The rest is a red herring.

    The weakening of the rule of law has major negative economic effects, so we are not looking here at a case of attacking one person or a small group of persons but rather of degrading the economic advancement of the entire nation.

    In the Ressa case, I am willing to accept the possibility that the facts fit the definition of the crime, and this is the angle the administration plays on.

    I am not willing to accept the violation of a foundational legal principle, the prohibition against the retrospective application of a law, especially a criminal law. I would guess that the majority of the population is ignorant of this principle—that is why lawyers should be there to protect them, not to take advantage of their ignorance, which is what happens when the law is weaponized by those in power.

    During the Marcos period, it is very apparent that political context had a powerful effect on the judicial outcomes and on the judicial reasoning itself. The same situation obtains here, and the judicial reasoning in the Ressa case should, I repeat, be read in the current political context of Duterte's habit of political vengeance. In this context, the decision lacks integrity.

    The reasoning, on its face, is specious. The crime has prescribed, and you cannot claim republication of the article on the basis of a tiny spelling correction. Bad decision, abominable precedent.

    Unfortunately, in instruction at law school, it is the study of decisions like the Ressa case that teaches students that you can twist the law to accomplish any conclusion that you want. One of the main reasons why I left law school is that students are instructed in casuistry sometimes entirely separated from any cogent ethics. The study of law in this country—it is not so in other countries—teaches students to use the law as a tool to entrench the power of politico-economic elites. One way of entrenching the power of the ruling class in this case is by weaponizing the law to persecute and quash the opposition and to buttress dictatorship.

    The law should be used to promote salutary democratic values—fundamental values like human rights and the rule of law, for example, both of which are moral imperatives convergent with the teachings of the Roman Catholic faith. Therefore, I seriously question—and doubt—the genuine religion of those Roman Catholics who use the law to advance the opposite.

    To be continued

    ReplyDelete
  6. Response: A Case of Legalism in Support of Immorality (continued)

    The following post, “The Misrule of Law in the Philippines,” contains some excellent sources explaining why the Ressa verdict, which is accomplished by weaponizing the law, controverting sound and established legal principles, and ultimately, seriously weakening the rule of law, has destructive economic repercussions. It goes to the heart of why the Ressa decision is a bad decision: it undermines the rule of law and degrades economic development.

    See: http://oddsandendsgonzalinhodacosta.blogspot.com/2018/02/the-misrule-of-law-in-philippines.html

    Democracy, of which the rule of law is a constitutive part, in the advancement of good governance has directly positive economic effects on development.

    In the Philippines, dictatorship is anti-development because it is joined to cronyism and plunder, with concomitant negative economic repercussions, gravely so. In this respect, it is immoral.

    “Fascism with Filipino Characteristics”:

    https://oddsandendsgonzalinhodacosta.blogspot.com/2020/06/fascism-with-filipino-characteristics.html

    “Political Morality”:

    https://oddsandendsgonzalinhodacosta.blogspot.com/2019/06/placeholder-2-of-4.html

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  7. Pre-decision piece (June 11, 2020) by John Nery:

    WHO’S AFRAID OF MARIA RESSA?
    By: John Nery - @jnery_newsstand
    Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:07 AM June 11, 2020

    On Monday, June 15, Judge Rainelda Estacio-Montesa of the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 46 will issue her decision in the controversial cyberlibel case against journalist Maria Ressa, former Rappler researcher-writer Reynaldo Santos Jr., and Rappler itself. The decision will be watched closely in newsrooms across the country and around the world.

    …The “liberal” tradition in court decisions on libel includes some of the most eloquent passages in official Philippine documents. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs Noel (1988), for example, we read Justice Feliciano’s marching orders to the free press: “A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.”

    …To find Rappler, Santos, and Ressa — now the fitting subject of acclaim around the world, for her persistence in calling her news organization and other journalists to #HoldTheLine in the face of systematic government harassment—all guilty of cyberlibel, Judge Estacio-Montesa must hurdle five obstacles:

    1. She must find that the defendants can in fact be charged under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which came into effect in September 2012, four months AFTER the article was published.

    2. To do that, she must accept the government prosecutors’ inventive legal theory of “continuous publication” or “multiple publication.”

    3. For her to accept that theory, she must tell the world that the correction on Feb. 19, 2014, of one word in the article — changing “evation” to “evasion” — meets the legal requirement of substantial modification.

    4. To argue the view that changing one letter means that the entire article, published before cyberlibel was defined in law, is now deemed to have been republished (that is, met the requirement of “republication,” which gives rise to a “new cause of action for defamation”), she must go against the grain of a century’s worth of jurisprudence, which has always held that (to cite a passage from two libel cases the Inquirer has won), “fair reports … should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.”

    5. To use that weaponized microscope, she must surmount the biggest hurdle of all: not seeing the bigger picture.

    …My hope is that Judge Estacio-Montesa follows the liberal tradition, and uses the law not to enshackle but, precisely, to liberate.

    On Twitter: @jnery_newsstand, email: jnery@inquirer.com.ph

    Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/130673/whos-afraid-of-maria-ressa#ixzz6RIeIxsBN

    Correcting a single minor spelling error is not “republication.”

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  8. An indicator of good governance is the accountability of the government, at the local and national levels.

    Are Filipino citizens given the power to hold their government accountable?

    Freedom of the press and freedom of speech are among the essential mechanisms in a democracy whereby governments are held accountable.

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  9. I had lunch once with Ressa when we were under Estrada. She said she studied molecular biology at Princeton. I asked her why she got into journalism. She said she liked drama (drama production) - and she said working as a journalist was like watching drama. She asked me what I was interested in. I said many things, for example, plants. I said I would be interested in studying plants and doing research on plants. She said she wasn't interested in that.

    Her skin was wrinkled around her neck, so I asked her what was the cause of that. She said she had some kind of blood disorder, a medical condition. I didn't pursue it further. She suffers from eczema.

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete
  10. Pope’s Monthly Prayer Intentions
    Apostleship of Prayer
    April 2021

    Fundamental rights

    We pray for those who risk their lives while fighting for fundamental rights under dictatorships, authoritarian regimes and even in democracies in crisis.

    Link: http://popesprayerusa.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/INTENZIONI-DEL-PAPA-2021-ENG-DEF.pdf

    Gonzalinho

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment