The Pragmatist Theory of Knowledge

Charles Sanders Peirce, c. 1870 photo

THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Pragmatist Axiom

“Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”

—Charles S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly, Volume 12 (January 1878)

According to the Pragmatist Axiom, our knowledge of reality is equivalent to our knowledge of “effects.” In Peirce’s understanding, “effects” are principally empirical, observable results.

For Peirce our abstract understanding does not amount to any genuine knowledge of reality. It is our knowledge of empirical, observable results that counts.

Elsewhere, Peirce says:

“The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.”

In other words, Peirce says that knowledge does not consist in the abstract concepts signified by symbols but rather in the actions, “rational,” that follow upon the symbols. For Peirce abstract concepts in themselves are of no consequence. What is significant are the ramifications of abstract concepts in rational actions.

Peirce’s emphasis on “effects” and “rational actions” is pragmatic. This pragmatic orientation is characteristically Anglo-American. Anglo-Americans are practical generally. They are motivated to accomplish pragmatic results in the observable, empirical world.

Pragmatism coincides with science in their convergent emphasis on empiricism.