ON FRATERNAL CORRECTION
“If your brother sins [against you], go and tell him his fault between
you and him alone. If he listens to you, you have won over your brother. If he
does not listen, take one or two others along with you, so that ‘every fact may
be established on the testimony of two or three witnesses.’ If he refuses to
listen to them, tell the church. If he refuses to listen even to the church,
then treat him as you would a Gentile or a tax collector.” (Matthew 18:15-17)
While fraternal correction is a salutary idea in theory—Jesus himself
advocates it—in practice it may be problematic for at least two reasons: moral
ambiguity; and the abuse of religious or spiritual authority.
Who is to say that the agent of fraternal correction is in the right,
or that he or she in a particular instance possesses the necessary moral
ascendancy? In all too many instances, moral ambiguity exists.
begin In the year 1054 slavery was widely accepted; in 1854 it was
widely, though not universally condemned; by 1954 it was universally condemned,
yet the residual practices connected with slavery, such as segregation and
racism, remained. Why were all of those practices tolerated, and even in many
instances applauded, whether in 1054, 1854, or 1954? We have argued that at
least in part this was due to the invincible ignorance of our culture at that
time. Yet with time and considerable corporate effort, we have reached a level
of insight on these issues which has lifted the veil of invincible ignorance on
a particular issue. What will we see in 2054 as morally reprehensible that is
tolerated today? How is this development in our cultural traditions of moral
wisdom achieved? With lots and lots of effort and moral energy expended over
time our moral vision has been and will continue to be corrected. So while
ignorance may seem to be invincible, this is not absolutely the case for all
time, as both individuals and whole societies can grow in moral wisdom. end
Source: James T. Bretzke, S.J., A Morally Complex World: Engaging
Contemporary Moral Theology (Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Philippines: Jesuit
Communications Foundation, Inc., 2004), page 137.
Fraternal correction so-called may be abused when in morally ambiguous
situations this practice is instigated, perpetrated, or co-opted by religious
or spiritual authority. Let us remember, for example, that for centuries it was
the Roman Catholic Church that taught that the practice of slavery was morally
acceptable under specific, commonplace conditions.
In contrast, by officially and categorically repudiating slavery in the
eighteenth century, the Quakers showed themselves more progressive than Roman
Catholics in this regard.
Fraternal correction is very easily abused as a means of enforcing
social conformity in morally ambiguous, or worse, morally oppressive
situations. Historically, for example, Roman Catholicism supported the practice
of slavery. Clergy, religious, and even popes owned slaves. Teaching the moral
acceptability of slavery might not be fraternal correction exactly, but the
effect of wielding religious and spiritual authority to enforce alignment with
questionable social values and norms is the same.
Let us not forget that the human being is homo socius. As a result, he or she readily succumbs to punitive
injunctions inspired by the impulse to social conformity, in morally ambiguous
situations especially so. Milgram’s experiment is a classic scientific
demonstration that by ready extrapolation remains a testament to the moral
frailty of social systems and institutions, including, remarkably so, that of
the Roman Catholic Church.
We might add that activism in opposition to morally questionable
beliefs and practices played an important role in the moral advancement of the
polity, illustrated in the case of systemic slavery. With respect to the
practice of slavery, still existing, activism continues to this day. We would
observe that activism—action—has both merit and efficacy, even though the
latter is necessarily limited. The point remains, however: action is morally
good. Manifestly, in at least some important instances, silence is moral
paralysis.
THE ERROR OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION
One of the most dramatic examples is narrated below. Observe the many
“corrections” that Murray received from powerful, influential persons in the
Roman Catholic Church.
begin Pope Pius IX made the point in no uncertain terms in 1846 in his
encyclical Quanta cura and the accompanying Syllabus of Errors: “The state must
recognize [the Catholic Church] as supreme and submit to its influence. . . .
The power of the state must be at its disposal and all who do not conform to
its requirements must be compelled or punished. . . . Freedom of conscience and
cult is madness.” Catholics were told that they need not openly oppose a
government that did not so recognize the church (as in the United States);
rather, they should tolerate the existing situation until such time as
Catholics formed a majority of the voting population.
Beginning in 1950 Father John Courtney Murray, a Jesuit theologian,
argued that the old tradition must yield. In a series of articles in
Theological Studies magazine and in public appearances, he contended that the
state should not be the tool of the church and has no business carrying out the
church’s will. Rather, he said, the civil government’s single yet profound
obligation is to insure the freedom of all its citizens, especially their
religious freedom.
“Every man has a right to religious freedom,” he wrote, “a right that
is based on the dignity of the human person and is therefore to be formally recognized
. . . and protected by constitutional law. . . . So great is this dignity that
not even God can take it away.” Murray claimed the old doctrine as enunciated
by Pius IX was not an absolute, static thing but a teaching that had been
developing over the past 100 years-a development which Murray saw in the
writings of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XII.
The reaction was vehement and instantaneous. The two most influential
U.S. Catholic theologians of the day, Fathers Joseph Fenton and Francis
Connell, called Murray’s argument “destructive, scandalous, and heretical” and
engaged in lengthy, published refutations, especially in the American
Ecclesiastical Review. Wrote Fenton, “The state is obligated to worship God
according to the one religion [God] has established. This is so obviously a
part of Catholic doctrine that no theologian has any excuse to call it into
question.”
Murray did not back down. He continued to develop his dissenting
interpretation and respond to his critics’ objections. His articles were sent
to Rome where they became the subject of considerable concern. In a much-quoted
speech in 1952, Cardinal Alberto Ottaviani, the head of the Congregation of the
Holy Office, declared (without mentioning Murray by name) that the teaching of
Pius IX was as valid now as it ever was, that the state must recognize the
church, and that freedom of conscience is an illusion.
Murray was clearly shaken by this clear message to cease and desist.
The following year he suffered a heart attack, but after recovery he continued
to develop his theory.
By 1954 the Vatican’s patience had been exhausted. A Roman censor
forbade the publication of an article that Murray had written and considered
crucial to his case. Murray’s Jesuit superior ordered him to cease writing on
the subject. When Murray inquired what he could write about, the superior said
he might consider poetry.
During the next four, difficult years Murray did not wear the gag
lightly. According to his biographer Donald Pilotte, he attempted to have the
banned article published anonymously. But the attempt was unsuccessful, as were
several other efforts to keep the debate alive. So for a time he wrote on
related but less sensitive matters.
In 1958, when a new pope, John XXIII, was elected, Murray emerged from
the closet. He pulled together the thrust of his arguments into a popular book
titled We Hold These Truths, whose publication just happened to coincide with
the presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy. Public worries in the United
States about what Kennedy, a Catholic, might do in office were greatly
dispelled by Murray’s well-argued contention that religious freedom and
separation of church and state were not mere tactics of toleration but valid
expressions of a developed Catholic doctrine.
Murray and his book made the cover of Time magazine, and the Kennedy
campaign relied on him for counsel concerning touchy church-state issues. Some
historians contend that it was not Mayor Richard J. Daley’s delivery of the
Chicago vote that got Kennedy elected but John Courtney Murray.
Still, top Catholic theologians and Roman officials regarded him as a
dangerous dissident. When plans were underway for the Second Vatican Council in
1962, Murray was expressly “disinvited” to join the commission of experts,
headed by Ottaviani and including Fenton, that was preparing a statement on
human freedom. Although he was experiencing chronic heart problems, Murray
would not accept the snub. He wrote to the American bishops on the commission,
urging them to fight against any rubber stamp of the outmoded Pius IX doctrine.
He was, in fact, so persistent that the U.S. bishops finally asked him to
assist the commission in Rome.
Armed with all his scholarship, he publicly debated the issues with
Fenton and Ottaviani and became a major drafter of the council’s Declaration on
Human Freedom. In its final form, approved in a vote by the world’s bishops,
2,308 to 80, in 1965, the declaration said, “This synod declares that the human
person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to
be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups, or any human
power . . . This synod further declares that the right to religious freedom has
its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is
known through the revealed word of God and reason itself.” The words reflect
Murray’s thinking and may very well have been written by him.
He lived only 18 months after that vote, succumbing in 1967 to another
heart attack at the age of 62, but his legacy is profound. His friend, Jesuit
Father Walter Burghardt, noted on the occasion of his death, “Unborn millions
will never know how much their freedom is tied to this man whose pen was a
powerful protest, a dramatic march against injustice and inequality, whose
research sparked and terminated in the ringing affirmation of an ecumenical
council: The right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the church,
not in society or state, not even in objective truth, but in the dignity of the
human person.”
That John Courtney Murray was a dissident is undeniable. That his
prolonged dissent was vindicated by the church at its highest level is equally
undeniable.
Although the Murray experience is dramatic, it is not essentially
different from the experiences of other scholars who have questioned the
absolute nature of some church teaching. Theologians like Jean Danilou, Yves
Congar, Karl Rahner, and Henri de Lubac all lived parts of their lives under
dark shadows of suspicion and accusation. end
—Robert
J. McClory, “Catholic dissent: When wrong turns out to be right,” U.S. Catholic, July 28, 2008
There are other historically prominent examples of the “error of
fraternal correction,” e.g. Theotokos controversy of the fifth century, Galileo
Galilei, Cardinal John Henry Newman.
Many personal experiences also testify to the “error of fraternal
correction,” less historically significant perhaps but no less compelling for
the persons involved.
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